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ABSTRACT
In this paper we argue that standard calls for explainability that 
focus on the epistemic inscrutability of black-box machine learning 
models may be misplaced. If we presume, for the sake of this paper, 
that machine learning can be a source of knowledge, then it makes 
sense to wonder what kind of justification it involves. How do we 
rationalize on the one hand the seeming justificatory black box 
with the observed widespread adoption of machine learning? We 
argue that, in general, people implicitly adopt reliabilism regard-
ing machine learning. Reliabilism is an epistemological theory of 
epistemic justification according to which a belief is warranted if it 
has been produced by a reliable process or method [18]. We argue 
that, in cases where model deployments require moral justifica-
tion, reliabilism is not sufficient, and instead justifying deployment 
requires establishing robust human processes as a moral “wrap-
per” around machine outputs. We then suggest that, in certain 
high-stakes domains with moral consequences, reliabilism does 
not provide another kind of necessary justification—moral justifica-
tion. Finally, we offer cautions relevant to the (implicit or explicit) 
adoption of the reliabilist interpretation of machine learning.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Epistemology is the systematic philosophical examination of knowl-
edge and is concerned with the nature of knowledge and how we 
acquire it [25]. Amongst philosophers, there is consensus that for 
a mental state to count as a knowledge state it must minimally 
be a justified, true belief. If we presume, for the sake of this pa-
per, that machine learning can be a source of knowledge, then it 
makes sense to wonder what kind of justification it involves. Prima 
facie, one might think that machine learning is epistemologically
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inscrutable [38]. After all, we don’t usually have access to the black
box in which models make decisions. Thus it might appear that
machine learning decisions qua knowledge don’t have sufficient
justification to count as knowledge. One might think this is because
the models don’t appear to have evidence or accessible reasons for
their output. We suggest that this underlies the widespread interest
in explainable or interpretable AI within the research community
as well as the general public. Despite this inscrutability, machine
learning is being deployed in human-consequential domains at a
rapid pace. Reliabilism is an epistemological theory of epistemic
justification according to which a belief is warranted if it has been
produced by a reliable process or method [18]. In this paper, we
explore what this means in the ML context. We then suggest that, in
certain high-stakes domains with moral consequences, reliabilism
does not provide another kind of necessary justification—moral
justification.
In this paper we argue that standard calls for explainability that
focus on the epistemic inscrutability of black-box machine learning
models may be misplaced. We further argue that in cases where
model outputs require epistemic and moral justification, there is
a need to establish robust human processes as a moral ”wrapper”
around machine outputs. Finally, we offer a general caution, rele-
vant if we adopt the reliabilist interpretation of ML models, to be
especially sensitive to distribution drift and to continually check
the fit of the model to the population it is intended to serve.
Machine learning has become a transformative technology that
is now impacting almost every aspect of life in many countries
[28]. Yet it is widely acknowledged that the precise mechanisms
by which machine learning generates predictions are quite mys-
terious [12]. This is because machine learning mixes myriad data
sources together into abstract mathematical objects—such as model
weights—which are not human-interpretable. Hence the models
are often called “black boxes” because we cannot peer into them to
find out how they work.
In this paper, we explore what we can learn about machine
learning if we consider it as a knowledge-generating enterprise.
We use the more specially defined sense of knowledge from the
fields of epistemology and philosophy of science, which is that
knowledge is justified, true belief. If machine learning is not a source
of knowledge, or is not at least intended to be a source of knowledge,
it seems self-negating to use machine learning in the first place. As
mentioned, within epistemology the fundamental conditions for a
mental state (without worrying about what mental states are) to
be counted as knowledge are that it is minimally a justified, true
belief. These conditions of justification, truth, and belief while being
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necessary for a mental state to count as knowledge are not, however,
sufficient. The Gettier Problem [16] 1 suggests that something else
in addition is required, however, we set aside the debate about
Gettier problems here as the focus is going to be on justification.
From a theoretical perspective in the field of machine learn-
ing, it is unclear why a certain configuration of weights or the
architecture of a neural network should perform any better than
another pattern. Machine learning practitioners and theoreticians
go through a number of trial-and-error iterations to find which
arrangement of elements and parameters in a model work best
for a given task. Once the performance has been optimized it is
not clear why the particular model arrangement produced optimal
results. Nonetheless, these weights and the non-linear functions
they represent, configured in certain layered patterns in a network,
can outperform humans on some tasks and games [1]. In a keynote
address at NeurIPS 2017 Ali Rahimi2 famously likened machine
learning to alchemy—in other words a prescientific discipline that
accidentally produces useful results. Despite this lack of theoret-
ical understanding, machine learning is adopted readily in many
domains of life that can have severe consequences for human be-
ings such as medicine [14], security [40], criminal justice [4], and
surveillance [2], among many others.
How can we reconcile this view of machine learning as alchemy
with our suggestion that we consider it to be a knowledge gener-
ating enterprise? On the basis of what epistemic grounds should
human society or science trust the knowledge produced by this
alchemical marvel? Because, in many domains, machine learning
yields successful results and where adopted it is often reliable (con-
sider, for example, machine translation and predictive recommen-
dations). We argue that that the adoption of machine learning
implicitly reflects a general reliabilist stance toward the outputs of
machine learning algorithms. Reliabilism is an approach to justifi-
cation and knowledge according to which a belief is warranted if
it has been produced by a reliable process or method [33]. On the
basis of reliabilism, it is enough that a belief has been the product
of a reliable process for it to be justified; that is, there is no further
requirement that the reliability of the process or method can be
independently proven or justified by the knower. We can know
things as a result of a reliable process (such as our neurobiologi-
cal system of visual perception) even if the precise causes of that
reliability are opaque to us.
Indeed, given the theoretical and epistemological situation in
machine learning, where the technology is far ahead of scientific
understanding, reliabilism seems to be the only available epistemic
approach to justification for believing the outputs of machine learn-
ing models.
Thus, despite the fact that what justifies the outputs of machine
learning models is not accessible to us, justification is not of neces-
sity imperilled so long as those outputs are produced by a reliable
1Gettier attempted to show that belief might be justified and true but not count as
knowledge. This is because it is possible for justification for a belief, while counting
as a legitimate source of justification, not to be justification for the specific belief in
question. That is, for a particular true belief, the justification one has might seem to
justify the belief but in fact it doesn’t. E.g., I believe my cousin is in town because I
saw him walking about. Turns out he is in town but the person I saw was his twin. So
I am justified in thinking he is in town and it is true he is in town, but I don’t know it
to be the case.
2https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7psGHgatGM
process. And while the possibility of reliabilist justification should
give us some comfort that we have not been flippant in accept-
ing the outputs of models whose inner workings are opaque to
us, in the second part of this paper we will argue that there are
contexts where a reliable process is not up to the task of providing
all the kinds of justification one might need; in particular, moral
justification.
2 MACHINE LEARNING AS A KNOWLEDGE
GENERATING ENTERPRISE
2.1 Types of Epistemic Justification and their
Relationship to Explainability
In epistemology and philosophy of science, justification is the prop-
erty of a true belief that converts it to knowledge [33]. In other
words, justification is the process of rendering a belief warranted.
The knowledge equation of knowledge = justified, true belief can
come apart: beliefs can be justified, though false. Justification is a
tool for maximizing true beliefs, but not an infallible one.
Let’s take a minute to conduct a brief overview of common
kinds of justification defended in the philosophical literature. And
in so doing we’ll address whether in these theories the form of
justification is explainable in a way that would matter for machine
learning.
Foundationalism is a form of justification which appeals to a
hierarchical linear theory wherein beliefs are divided into two cate-
gories: basic (which are self-justified or self-evident) and derived
(which depend on the basic beliefs and whose justification is in-
ferential) [33]. Basic beliefs are phenomenal or the result of sense
data.
Coherentism in contrast denies the division between beliefs into
basic and derived. According to coherentism, all beliefs are justified
insofar as the system as a whole is justified. If a belief coheres with
the rest of your beliefs it is justified. A problem for coherentism
is that it cannot easily explain how beliefs relate to the world.
Thus some priority must be given to beliefs that are not justified
exclusively on the basis of their internal connections to other beliefs.
This modified version of coherentism was defended by Quine and
is known as the “web of beliefs” [35].
There are also appeals to authority defended by philosophers
over the centuries [42]. We can justify our beliefs by appealing to
expert opinion or authorities on a topic. We might believe in black
holes because we read a book by Stephen Hawking. But again, the
problem of fallibilism comes in because even Stephen Hawking can
be wrong.
These forms of justification are all explainable; we can cite the
sources or reasons that render our beliefs warranted even if these
forms of justification do not guarantee that our beliefs are knowl-
edge.
However, as hinted at, within epistemology we can have justifi-
cation without explainability and this is reliabilism. For a reliable
process to be justified, there is no further requirement that the
reliability of the process or method is independently proven or
justified. Human perceptual processes are putative examples of a
reliable process, e.g., “I know that the door is closed” because my
visual system produces this perception and whenever I have this
perception and I get to where the door is, it is closed. Here too the
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possibility of justified false belief occurs. Psychological phenomena
such as change blindness and choice blindness are common exam-
ples of justified false belief [20]. In the animal kingdom for example,
because dragonflies use polarized light to guide them to water, they
often land in pools of oil because oil polarizes light to a far greater
degree than water [22]. Thus, dragonflies mistakenly believe pools
of oil are pools of water, land in them and become stuck. For the
purposes of this paper, we do not need to address debates about
virtue reliabilism, internalist versus externalist interpretations of
reliabilism and the many other permutations of reliabilism. [17].
However, future work on reliabilism and machine learning should
address these issues.
The fundamental point about adopting a reliabilist interpretation
of machine learning is this: the fact that we can’t explain what’s
going on inside a machine learning model does not matter because
reliabilism shows us that the inscrutability of a process is not a bar
to its conferring justification. Conceived as embodying a reliable
process, machine learning is a truth-conducive or truth-getting
knowledge-generating process.3 To an extent, this vindicates the
common reliance on machine learning.4
3 THE RELIABILIST INTERPRETATION
OF MACHINE LEARNING
Reliabilism in fact shifts the focus of epistemology from the subject’s
own cognition, which is taken to be transparent in terms of being
able to provide reasons for beliefs, to the natural (in the case of
machine learning, artificial) processes andmethods by which beliefs
can be gained and sustained [33]. A stronger version of reliabilism
is known as process reliabilism. The idea of process reliabilism for
theories of epistemic justification is: a belief is justified if and only
if it is produced by a process that reliably leads to true belief [11].
There are increasing calls for “explainability” for machine learn-
ing algorithms because their nested non-linear structure makes the
explanation for their outputs inscrutable [19, 21, 37]. This includes
nascent regulatory and legislative approaches outlining a right to
an explanation [36]. Researchers and regulators are shifting their
focus to techniques and incentives to produce machine-learning
systems that can explain themselves to their human users [30]. As
Kluttz et al. argue and, on the reliabilist approach, these calls for
explainability may be misplaced, at least when focusing on the
epistemic justification problem rather than the moral justification
problem as we will argue below.
The lack of information about what exactly makes models ar-
rive at their predictions is unsettling, especially for domains like
medicine. As humans, we search for causes and look for explana-
tions in order to understand how and why things around us are the
way they are, or behave in certain ways [34]. An explanation is an
answer to a why question. The reliabilist approach to justification
is, however, precisely justification without explainability. We are
justified in accepting the outputs of a model because of the truth-
indicating properties of machine learning models. On the reliabilist
3If machine learning is not a truth-conducive knowledge-generating process this
represents a much deeper problem that is outside the scope of this paper.
4There are still other internalist and externalist theories of justification that we have
not discussed. However, for our present purposes of opening up new lines of inquiry,
it is not necessary that we be comprehensive in this survey.
approach we do not need to understand the black box model to
believe its output, and to have that output count as knowledge.
There are many examples used to explicate reliabilism—here
is a classic one. Feldman [15] presents the following case that is
pertinent to machine learning epistemology: two bird-watchers,
a novice and an expert, are together in the woods when a pink-
spotted flycatcher lands on branch. Both the novice and the expert
believe that the bird is a pink-spotted flycatcher. Both are correct,
but reliabilism argues that only the expert is justified in their belief
about the bird’s identity. This is because the novice is only guessing,
whereas the expert is matching their vast store of knowledge in
memory about bird species to their current visual experience of
the bird sitting nearby. The latter process is reliable, whereas the
guesses of a novice are not. Crucially, the bird-watching expert
would not be able to precisely articulate the cognitive and neural
processes involved in their positive identification of the bird—in
other words the way in which the bird-watching expert is justified
is not completely explainable. They might say something like, “I’m
a bird-watching expert, that is how I know it’s a pink-spotted
flycatcher.”
We can compare the difference between the novice and expert
bird-watcher to a machine learning algorithm trained to classify
birds. A trained bird-classification algorithm would have processed
millions of pictures of birds, including many examples of the pink-
spotted flycatcher. So even if we cannot see precisely which input
features and which correlations between these features and the
output caused the algorithm to identify the pink-spotted flycatcher,
we know that a well-trained neural network will identify the correct
bird a very high percentage of the time (because it is based on in-
domain data)—thus the network tends to track truth in this case.
Using a machine learning algorithm to identify a bird is reliable,
and in some cases might even be more reliable than an expert bird-
watcher. We can’t explain exactly what the deep learning network
is doing, but it does not matter in this case because the process is
reliable.
Reliabilism has traditionally focused on the natural processes by
which knowledge can be acquired and maintained, and therefore
a diagnosis of reliabilism with regards to machine learning might
be met with some skepticism. Next we consider some possible
objections to reliabilism.
3.1 Objections to Using Reliabilism to Account
for the Black Box
An objection is that even reliable knowledge-forming processes
remain fallible—yet according to the knowledge equation (where
knowledge = justified, true belief) it seems as though knowledge
must be by definition infallible [25]. If we say S knows that P, and
yet grant that there is a certain possibility that not-P it seems as
if S does not after all know that P [25]. This apparent incoherence
of the notion of fallible knowledge can be resolved, however, by
granting that we never have fallible (actual) knowledge, yet individ-
ual knowledge claims may sometimes be fallible, even when they
arise from generally reliable processes. This is true both for claims
arising from reliable natural knowledge-generating processes such
as ordinary perception, and for claims arising from reliable artificial
knowledge-generating processes, such as reliable machine learning
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models. Indeed, the stochastic nature of many machine learning
models entails that model fallibility coexists with model reliability.
Naturally, we do not want to use machine learning to generate
falsehoods, and we do not want to mistakenly believe falsehoods
generated by machine learning models. As Leplin [24] argues, epis-
temic justification is justification that advances the epistemic goal
of believing truths without believing falsehoods. However, it is
widely known that machine learning algorithms are fragile when
tested on data that was not part of the training distribution [29],
and thus can be prone to generating falsehoods when deployed
in real world settings. A deep learning model with billions of pa-
rameters trained and evaluated on ImageNet can be expected to be
accurate on images like those in ImageNet, but for real world scenes
these models become very brittle [29]. Thus we have to restrict the
domains in which models are reliable.
Machine learning algorithms, ostensibly in contrast to humans,
lack reasons in the strict sense for their output. Furthermore, un-
less a human manually retrains a new model, machine learning
algorithms cannot update their predictions to include extenuating
circumstances or unanticipated but relevant information. While
this might make machine learning seem irrational, in the sense
of being non-responsive to reasons that are salient, we argue that
under the process reliabilist interpretation we can nevertheless be
justified in believing the output of an algorithm.
4 ARE CALLS FOR EXPLAINABILITY
MISPLACED? EPISTEMIC VERSUS MORAL
JUSTIFICATION
Given the reliabilist interpretation of justification in the ML context,
one might be inclined to dismiss calls for explainabiity as hanging
on a naive understanding of what kinds of justification are possible.
But is that right—should we be so quick to abandon the intuition
that explainability matters? Several authors have argued for similar
shifts away from explanations of models or algorithms themselves,
to explanations of the processes and design decisions that lead to
the creation, deployment and use of the algorithm [6, 30, 38].
Many machine learning models carry out functions that go be-
yond simple classification or entertainment. Machine learning mod-
els are now used to make many very morally consequential deci-
sions. The much-discussed COMPAS algorithm gives prisoners a
risk score which should predict the likelihood that they will re-
commit a crime once released (or more accurately, the likelihood
they will be re-arrested [13]). This score is then used as part of the
decision about whether to release the prisoner [9]. Credit scoring
companies are increasingly using machine learning to determine
credit risk and loan worthiness [23, 27]. Humans in positions of
power then use the outputs of these models to make decisions about
other humans that have severe consequences for the individual in
question. They may have to stay in jail longer, they may be rejected
for a loan that would have drastically altered the course of their
life.
In many of the most common commercial domains of machine
learning such as predicting churn among app users, content recom-
mendation,5 or ad targeting the moral consequences of the model’s
5Although a case can be made that the moral consequences of content recommendation
are high
outputmay prima facie be considered less important. These domains
may not require the same kind of moral justification as decisions
that directly impact the life course of an individual, or in cases
where models exhibit algorithmic discrimination, and reinforce a
legacy of structural racism [3]. Digging deeper though, it might be
possible to infer sexual orientation based on content recommen-
dations, which may be morally consequential in contexts where
some orientations are persecuted. Thus even seemingly morally
inconsequential models can be morally consequential in certain
contexts [39].
Even if we are epistemically justified under reliabilism in believ-
ing the outputs of machine learning without explainability, in the
next section we argue that reliabilism does not provide sufficient
justification in cases where moral knowledge is at stake.
4.0.1 Moral Knowledge and Moral Epistemology. Continuing along
on our assumption thatmachine learning is a knowledge-generating
enterprise, some models will be considered to generate morally rel-
evant knowledge. Here we are thinking about those models whose
outputs are human consequential (e.g., COMPAS). We do not claim
that machine learning models can generate moral knowledge itself,
as it is unclear that these systems can reliably track moral properties
or salience. However, morally relevant outputs of machine learn-
ing models may be incorporated into moral knowledge. From an
epistemological point of view, moral knowledge is just a subset of
knowledge. One can be said to have moral knowledge when one’s
moral beliefs are true and held justifiably. We are not, however,
going to wade into the debate on whether moral facts exist, even
though there might be empirically compelling reasons to think so
(from anthropological evidence it seems that there are core moral
values shared globally) [8]. We’ll avoid this because much of the
value in what we are going to say only requires that it’s plausible
that the output of a model could contribute to moral knowledge 6.
5 REQUIREMENTS OF MORAL
JUSTIFICATION
Inasmuch as we are considering the output of a machine learning
model as contributing to moral knowledge, we have to consider the
kind of justification that could provide warrant for such knowledge.
Can there, for example, be reliabilist moral justification?
It will be instructive to look at domainswhere human-consequential
decisions are frequently made for some inspiration. When a human
decision-maker is required to make a consequential decision about
other humans, there are often elaborate institutions and practices
to ensure legally and socially sanctioned accountability or over-
sight around the decision [41]. For example, in the legal, medical
and banking industries there are regulations, institutions and laws
which govern the way in which decisions can be justified and grant
people, at least in principle, the right to redress impactful decisions.
In other words, moral decisions must be defeasible or contestable.
Additionally, notions of accountability require that a decisionmaker
must be able to show how the decision fits into the context in which
6The nature and possibility of moral knowledge has long been debated in philosophy.
Together with his skepticism about causal knowledge, Hume likewise was skeptical
about the possibility of moral knowledge [31]. However, since Socrates philosophers
have also claimed that moral knowledge is not only possible but necessary for virtuous
action [32]
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a decision is made and how it is amenable to the moral constraints
of that context.
We argue that in cases of moral knowledge, justification cannot
be reliabilist. If the requirements of moral justification are defea-
sibility/contestability and accountability; a black-box reliabilism
does not admit of either of the requirements of moral justification.
The strong version of our argument is that if a decision maker is
using machine learning in a high-stakes domain to aid in decisions
or make decisions more efficient, the decision maker is implicitly
adopting reliabilism about the machine learning output. In other
words, we argue that because the black box of the model does
not provide justification other than the reliabilist one, the decision
maker, in virtue of using the model’s output, is a reliabilist. But, re-
liabilism does not provide moral justification for the use of machine
learning in high stakes domains. Something else is needed, namely
the possibility to contest the machine learning model and to hold
the humans designing and deploying the system accountable.
Core to requirements for moral justification in decision making
are the notions of defeasibility, contestability and accountability.
Contestability is at the heart of legal rights that afford individuals
access to personal data and insight into the decision-making process
used to classify them [30]. With current machine learning models, it
is not possible to argue or reason with the model in order to ”defeat”
its output. A person sentenced to a longer prison term because of
an algorithmic risk score cannot provide extenuating circumstances
or new information to the model that might mitigate the risk score.
This is because the model is opaque, its inputs are not contestable
[7]. Themodel’s output is based on aggregated statistical groups and
makes decisions based on averages and statistical generalizations.
Thus a machine learning risk score algorithm can explain that,
for example, there might be a certain rate of re-arrest among a
group of 10,000 prisoners with a very high probability; the model
cannot explain why a specific individual is likely to be re-arrested.
That is, statistical generalizations fail to capture a causal connection
between crime and individuals [34].
Empirically, Binns [5] found that people do consider justice-
related aspects of algorithmic decision-making systems, much as
they do for manual decision-making processes, providing evidence
for the requirement of defeasibility. Binns further found that de-
pending on how and when they are deployed, explanations may
or may not help individuals to evaluate the fairness of such deci-
sions. In other words, we interpret this to indicate that epistemic
justification may not provide the relevant moral justification. And
this would follow from the fact that algorithmic decision-making
systems are not defeasible in themselves, nor in the contexts of
their use.
We follow the framework for contestability developed by [30]
who argue that effective systems that also align with societal values
require not only designs that foster in-the-moment human engage-
ment with such systems but also governance models that support
ongoing critical engagement with system processes and outputs.
They define contestability as - the ability to challenge machine pre-
dictions. This ability is a necessary but insufficient component of
moral justification.
Finally, we argue that black-box reliabilism does not admit ac-
countability. Accountability is generally defined as the state of being
responsible or answerable [10]. There is an ongoing debate about
how to attribute responsibility to machine learning systems. As
AI technologies gain more agency, it becomes difficult to attribute
responsibility for when models fail. However, humans remain re-
sponsible for such failures because only humans still meet the
criteria for moral agency and moral responsibility [6].
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we argue that by considering machine learning as a
knowledge-generating enterprise we can advance the discussion
on explainability. We have introduced an epistemological argu-
ment that shifts standard calls for explainability from the epistemic
inscrutability of black box models to an examination of moral justi-
fication. In other words, on the reliabilist approach to justification,
standard calls for explainability focused on epistemic inscrutability
of black box models are probably misplaced. As we have argued,
despite the fact that what justifies the outputs of machine learning
models is not accessible to us, justification is not of necessity im-
perilled so long as those outputs are produced by a reliable process.
However, reliabilism does not provide moral justification as it does
not not admit of defeasibility, contestability or accountability in
situations where the human consequences of the output do not
merely depend on the model’s accuracy but these consequences
demand a higher standard. This provides a philosophical under-
pinning to similar calls within the AI accountability literature to
move beyond black box model explainability that only focuses on
epistemic inscrutability, and instead toward models that allow for
challenges to their predictions [6, 30].
To further defeasibility, contestability and accountability, in con-
texts where model outputs require moral as well as epistemic jus-
tification we suggest the necessity of establishing robust human
processes as a moral ’wrapper’ around machine outputs, processes
carefully designed and tested to ensure these three criteria of moral
justification are met.
Finally, a general caution, but perhaps more relevant if we adopt
the reliabilist interpretation of ML models, is to be especially sen-
sitive to population drift and to periodically check the fit of the
model to the population it is intended to serve. This problem is
already recognized by the machine learning field in the problem of
detecting distributional drift. Even shifts in label distribution can
compromise accuracy of state-of-the-art classifiers [26].
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